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THE USE OF PILOT FINANCING TO DEVELOP
MANHATTAN’S FAR WEST SIDE
Amy F. Cerciello*

INTRODUCTION
On January 19, 2005, the Bloomberg Administration revealed the details
of a plan to transform Manhattan’s Far West Side. 1 The plan authorizes the
extension of the Number Seven subway line and the construction of new
office space, housing, streets, and parks. 2 The Bloomberg Administration
intends to finance these public improvements outside of New York City’s
capital budget. A newly created local development corporation called the
Hudson Yards Infrastructure Corporation will issue bonds backed by
revenues that the new development is expected to generate.3 The largest

*J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2000, Yale University. I
would like to thank Professor Aaron Saiger for his helpful guidance on this Comment.
1. Press Release, N.Y. City Council, Miller and Council Members Announce Details of
Far
West
Side
Plan
(Jan.
10,
2005),
at
http://www.nyccouncil.info/pdf_files/newswire/1_10_05_west_side.pdf [hereinafter Miller
and Council Members]. Manhattan’s Far West Side (also called the Hudson Yards) consists
of “the area bounded by the south side of West Forty-third Street on the north, the east side
of Eleventh Avenue on the west, generally, the north side of West Twenty-seventh Street
and West Thirtieth Street on the south, and the west side of Seventh and Eighth Avenues on
the east.” Press Release, City of N.Y. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, New York City
Announces Lead Underwriters for Hudson Yards Infrastructure Corporation (Feb. 11,
2004), at www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/omb/pdf/press02_04a.pdf [hereinafter New York City
Announces Lead Underwriters].
2. New York City Announces Lead Underwriters, supra note 1. The Bloomberg
Administration concurrently planned to expand the Jacob K. Javits Center (“Javits Center”)
and construct a new stadium for the New York Jets. Id. After New York City lost its bid to
host the 2012 Olympic Games, however, the stadium project was tabled. See, e.g.,
CharlesV. Bagli, Schumer Calls for Action on Two West Side Development Plans, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2005, at B4 (citing “the collapse of the stadium project in Manhattan”).
The City may still go ahead with the Javits expansion, but that project would be financed
separately from the Hudson Yards development, and therefore I do not discuss it. See id.
(noting that U.S. Senator Charles Schumer called “for New York City to move ahead
swiftly” on the Javits Center expansion); see also THERESA J. DEVINE, N.Y. CITY INDEP.
BUDGET OFFICE, WEST SIDE FINANCING’S COMPLEX, $1.3BN STORY 13 n.2 (2004), at
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us [hereinafter DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY].
3. See infra notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
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anticipated revenue source for bond repayment is commercial payments in
lieu of taxes (“PILOTs”) made by private developers who build within the
development zone. 4
PILOT-backed bonds are a unique and little used mode of financing.
New York City has never issued PILOT-backed bonds before, 5 and they
are a rare structure in the municipal debt markets.6 Yet, PILOT financing
has a close analog: tax increment financing (“TIF”). TIF is a popular local
redevelopment financing mechanism. 7 Since its inception in California in
1952, all fifty states have implemented legislation authorizing the use of
TIF. 8 This Comment discusses TIF and its legal and financial drawbacks,
and then applies the lessons learned from TIF to PILOT financing. Part I
describes TIF’s general structure and underlying rationale and then
examines New York State’s TIF statute. Part II considers the legal
challenges that have been raised against TIF and predicts their likely
outcome in a New York court. Part III explores the risks and policy
considerations surrounding the use of TIF. It also considers whether TIF
really is a self-financing redevelopment mechanism, as its proponents
argue. Finally, Part IV examines the limited use of TIF in New York and
proposes an explanation for its scarcity. It also outlines the similarities
between TIF and PILOT financing, and explains how the legal issues, risks,
and policy considerations surrounding the use of TIF apply with equal
force to PILOTs. It concludes by recommending some changes to the Far
West Side’s PILOT financing plan, based on the lessons learned from TIF.
I. TAX INCREMENT FINANCING: THE BASICS
This section begins by explaining the basic structure of TIF—in
particular, how tax revenues get allocated during the life of a TIF project.
It then describes TIF’s basic assumptions and underlying rationale.
Finally, it examines New York State’s TIF statute.
4. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
5. Michael McDonald, N.Y.C. Sees $2.7B in West Side Bonds, BOND BUYER, Feb. 12,
2004, at 44 [hereinafter McDonald, West Side Bonds].
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Joyce A. Man, Introduction, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 1 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds.,
2001). By 1992, over 5,400 municipalities in forty-four states had used TIF. Jeffrey
Chapman, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Redevelopment, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TAX AND LAND USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 183 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1998). As of
2001, fifty-six percent of cities with populations over 100,000 had used TIF. J. Drew
Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 15, 18 (Craig L.
Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001).
8. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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A. Tax Increment Financing’s Structure and Rationale
TIF allows local governments to finance development projects with the
increased tax revenue generated by the redeveloped property. 9 The initial
property tax base of the redevelopment zone (the “TIF district”) is “frozen”
on the tax roll. 10 As the redevelopment progresses, property values and
property tax collections should increase.11 The taxing authorities continue
to receive tax revenue based on the frozen base value, 12 while the excess
tax collections (the “tax increment”) flow into a special fund that is used to
make interest and principal payments on the TIF bonds. 13 The original
taxing authorities do not get any of the tax increment until the TIF bonds
are repaid. 14
Two central assumptions underlie the use of TIF. The first assumption
is that property values would remain constant without the stimulation
provided by TIF. 15 The second assumption is that the redevelopment
causes the increase in property values and the corresponding increase in tax
revenue. 16
Because TIF projects are financed from the incremental tax revenue
generated by the redevelopment, TIF proponents argue that TIF is a self-

9. See, e.g., Sam Casella, What is TIF?, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 1 (James
Hecimovich ed., 1985); Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment
Financing and Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 162 (1998)
(“The driving force behind tax increment financing is the premise that the public will benefit
from the increases in tax revenue created by the redeveloped property.”); Gary P. Winter,
Tax Increment Financing: A Potential Redevelopment Financing Mechanism for NY
Municipalities, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 655, 655 (1991) (noting that TIF “exploits the rise in
economic value and hence the increase in tax receipts which accompanies urban
redevelopment”); Catherine Michel, Note, Brother, Can You Spare a Dime: Tax Increment
Financing in Indiana, 71 IND. L.J. 457, 458 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 7, at 183; Jonathan M. Davidson, Tax Increment
Financing as a Tool for Community Redevelopment, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 405, 410 (197879); Randall V. Reece & M. Duane Coyle, Urban Redevelopment: Utilization of Tax
Increment Financing, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 536, 538 (1979-80).
11. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 7, at 183.
12. See, e.g., id.; Davidson, supra note 10, at 410; Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at
538.
13. E.g., Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at 538. The “tax increment” represents the
difference between “the assessment based on the frozen base value and the amount of tax
levied on the current value of the improved property.” Id.
14. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 9, at 163-64 (“Until the costs incurred by the
redevelopment agency are repaid through the tax increment, all public entities that normally
receive tax revenue from the property within the project area are limited to revenue based on
the frozen valuation.”).
15. See Davidson, supra note 10, at 410.
16. Id.
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financing mechanism. 17 In theory, the municipality does not have to
pledge funds from its capital budget or increase taxes to fund the
development. 18 This characteristic of TIF helps explain its increasing
popularity. 19
B. New York State’s Tax Increment Financing Statute
TIF originated in California in 1952 as a way to provide local matching
funds for federal urban renewal grants.20 Now all fifty states have
legislation authorizing the use of TIF. 21 New York authorized the use of
TIF in 1984 with the passage of the Municipal Redevelopment Law ( “TIF
statute”). 22

17. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 7, at 184 (“What seemingly has occurred is that the
redevelopment activities have become self-financing: the increment in land value generates
the revenue to pay for the debt that was used to finance the expenditures that helped to cause
the increment in land value.”); Neil deMause, Scrounging Up $3 Billion in ‘New’ Tax
Money? Hey, No Problem, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 22, 2003 [hereinafter deMause,
Scrounging] (“The promise of TIFs is no less than magical: to generate millions of dollars in
subsidies for private developers, without costing the local government a dime.”). See infra
Part III.E for an analysis of whether TIF really is a self-financing mechanism as its
proponents argue.
18. See, e.g., Joyce Y. Man, Determinants of the Municipal Decision to Adopt Tax
Increment Financing, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES,
STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 93 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001); Reece &
Coyle, supra note 10, at 540.
19. See, e.g., Casella, supra note 9, at 1; deMause, Scrounging, supra note 17 (“TIFs are
the fastest-growing development subsidy . . . [because] they supposedly neither require new
taxes nor the use of existing ones.”).
20. See, e.g., Klacik & Nunn, supra note 7, at 17.
21. By 1997, forty-eight states had passed laws authorizing the use of TIF; only
Delaware and North Carolina did not have TIF statutes. Craig L. Johnson & Kenneth A.
Kriz, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing Laws, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 31 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce
Y. Man eds., 2001). Delaware’s TIF statute (called the Municipal Tax Increment Financing
Act), codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1701-1715, became effective in 2003. North
Carolina finally followed suit in November 2004, when voters approved a constitutional
amendment authorizing the use of TIF and the issuance of TIF debt. See Richard Rubin,
Amendment 1: A New Tool, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 13, 2004, at B1. North Carolina’s
TIF statute (called the Project Development Financing Act) is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 159-101 to 159-113. For a discussion of North Carolina’s TIF legislation, see P. Michael
Juby, Tax Increment Financing in North Carolina: The Myth of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1526 (2005).
22. In November 1983, the New York Constitution was amended to authorize the use of
TIF. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. New York’s TIF statute is codified at N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW §§ 970-a to 970-q (McKinney 2005).
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1. The Blight and “Cannot be Accomplished by Private Enterprise Alone”
Requirements
Under New York’s TIF statute, two criteria must be met before a
municipality can implement a TIF project. First, TIF can only be used to
redevelop “blighted areas.” 23 Second, TIF can only be used when “the
redevelopment of such areas cannot be accomplished by private enterprise
alone.” 24 Most states’ TIF statutes contain similar requirements.25
2. The Planning Phase
After the local legislature identifies a blighted area, it must conduct a
study to determine the feasibility of the proposed redevelopment. 26 If the
legislative body concludes that the project is feasible, the next step is to
prepare a preliminary plan that justifies the project. 27 The plan must
describe the project and its likely impact on the surrounding neighborhoods
and the environment. 28 It also must explain why redevelopment would not
occur without TIF. 29
If the legislative body approves the preliminary plan, it then must
prepare a redevelopment plan. 30 In addition to confirming the information
23. § 970-b. Section 970-c(a) defines a “blighted area” as:
an area within a municipality in which one or more of the following conditions
exist: (i) a predominance of buildings and structures which are deteriorated or
unfit or unsafe for use or occupancy; or (ii) a predominance of economically
unproductive lands, buildings or structures, the redevelopment of which is needed
to prevent further deterioration which would jeopardize the economic well being
of the people.
This vague definition gives local officials considerable discretion in identifying “blighted
areas.” THERESA J. DEVINE, N.Y. CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, LEARNING FROM
EXPERIENCE: A PRIMER ON TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 2 (2002), at
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us [hereinafter DEVINE, PRIMER]. New York’s TIF statute is not
unique; most states’ TIF statutes lack any quantifiable criteria for identifying blight. See
Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive
Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 320 (2004). As a result, municipalities and
redevelopment agencies “have enjoyed wide latitude in defining or determining blight.” Id.
24. § 970-b.
25. E.g., Josh Reinert, Comment, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is It Time for
Blight and But-For To Go?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1019, 1020 (2001) (these two requirements
are “the principal tests required of any municipality to proceed with the use of TIF on a
redevelopment initiative”).
26. § 970-d. Although the legislative body ultimately designates the survey area by
resolution, any person, group, association or corporation may request the designation of a
particular area. Id.
27. § 970-e.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. § 970-f.
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provided in the preliminary plan, the redevelopment plan must describe the
proposed method of financing. 31 If the redevelopment will be funded with
TIF bonds, then the plan must indicate the amount and term of the bonds
that will be issued. 32 The legislature then must submit the redevelopment
plan to the planning agency for review.33 The planning agency is expected
to file its comments within thirty days of receiving the plan.34
3. Public Hearing Requirement
Before adopting the redevelopment plan, the legislative body must
present the plan at a public hearing. 35 It must post notice of the hearing in
a local newspaper and in at least four prominent public locations in the
affected area at least three weeks prior to the hearing. 36 The notice must
include a legal description of the boundaries of the project area and a
summary of the plan. 37
Anyone who objects to the proposed plan may challenge it at the public
hearing. 38 The TIF statute requires the legislative body to “hear and
consider” all objections.39 After the hearing, the legislative body may
officially adopt the redevelopment plan.40
The legislative body may amend the redevelopment plan at any time
after it is adopted. 41 But the amendments must go through the
aforementioned public notice and hearing process before the legislature can
adopt them. 42
4. Implementation
After the legislature adopts the redevelopment plan, the municipality has
the authority to acquire property, relocate displaced individuals, demolish
or move buildings, and prepare the site for redevelopment. 43 The statute

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. § 970-g.
34. Id.
35. § 970-h(a). The legislative body must hold additional public hearings on a biennial
basis to review and evaluate the progress of the TIF project. Id.
36. § 970-h(b).
37. Id.
38. § 970-h(c).
39. § 970-h(d).
40. § 970-h(f).
41. § 970-m.
42. Id.
43. §§ 970-i to 970-l.
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permits the municipality to assign these administrative powers to a local
government agency. 44
5. Tax Increment Bonds
To carry out the redevelopment plan, the TIF statute authorizes the
municipality to issue bonds payable from and secured by real property
taxes (“TIF bonds”). 45 The municipality can only issue TIF bonds for
certain public purposes, however, including the acquisition of land, the
demolition and removal of structures, and the construction of streets,
walkways, public utilities, parks, and playgrounds. 46 The statute expressly
provides that TIF bonds may not be secured by the “faith and credit” of the
local government 47 and that they will not count toward the issuing
municipality’s constitutional debt limitation.48
II. SUCCESSFUL LEGAL CHALLENGES TO TIF STATUTES
Although no one has challenged New York’s TIF statute thus far, a
number of constitutional arguments have been raised against other states’
TIF statutes. 49 Of those, three have prevailed. 50 This section examines

44. Id. Most TIF statutes permit a municipality to exercise redevelopment powers either
directly or through a redevelopment agency. See Casella, supra note 9, at 3.
45. § 970-o(a).
46. § 970-o(i).
47. § 970-o(b).
48. § 970-o(g).
49. The majority of courts considering TIF have found the TIF statutes constitutional
against a variety of challenges. See, e.g., Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d
1374 (Colo. 1980) (TIF does not violate constitutional debt limitations, constitutional
prohibition against pledging of credit, or state constitutional prohibitions of nonuniform
taxation); City of Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. 1980) (TIF does not violate public
purpose doctrine or uniformity clause); S. Bend Pub. Transp. Corp. v. City of S. Bend, 428
N.E.2d 217 (Ind. 1981) (TIF does not violate equal protection, due process, uniform and
equal taxation requirement, constitutional debt limitations, or constitutional provision
prohibiting laws that impair contracts); Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48
(Iowa 1975) (TIF upheld against attacks relating to due process, equal protection,
constitutional debt limitations, and delegation of legislative authority); State ex rel. Tomasic
v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte County, 962 P.2d 543 (Kan. 1998) (TIF does not violate
public purpose doctrine, equal protection, or constitutional debt limitations); State ex rel.
Schneider v. City of Topeka, 605 P.2d 556 (Kan. 1980) (TIF does not violate uniform and
equal taxation requirement and is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power); Delogu
v. Maine, 720 A.2d 1153 (Me. 1998) (TIF does not violate public purpose doctrine or equal
taxation requirement); Request for Advisory Opinion on the Constitutionality of 1986 PA
281, 422 N.W.2d 186 (Mich. 1988) (TIF does not unconstitutionally lend the credit of the
state or municipality); R.E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1978)
(TIF does not violate public purpose doctrine); City of Sparks v. Best, 605 P.2d 638 (Nev.
1980) (TIF does not constitute unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Meierhenry
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those three arguments and predicts the likely outcome if they are ever
raised in a New York court.
A. TIF Bonds and Constitutional Debt Limits
1. Generally
All state constitutions limit the amount of public debt that municipalities
can incur. 51 Courts are divided over whether TIF debt counts toward these
limits.
Courts in the following states have considered the issue and concluded
that TIF debt is subject to constitutional debt limitations: Arizona, Iowa,
Kentucky, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.52
With the exception of South Dakota, each of these states’ TIF statutes
expressly provides that TIF debt does not count toward constitutional debt
limitations. 53 Yet such provisions are not controlling. According to the

v. City of Huron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984) (TIF does not violate equal protection or due
process guarantees, public purpose doctrine, state constitutional prohibition of nonuniform
taxation, or constitutional provision prohibiting laws that impair contracts); Metro. Dev. &
Hous. Agency v. Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. 1979) (TIF does not constitute an
unconstitutional diversion of taxes and does not amount to an unconstitutional taking of
property); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975) (TIF upheld against
constitutional challenges regarding debt limitations).
50. See infra Parts II.A-C.
51. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL
SYSTEM 389 (rev. 5th ed. 2003). For example, New York’s Constitution imposes the
following debt limits, measured as percentages of the average full valuation of taxable real
estate in the municipality:
(a) Nassau County, for county purposes, 10%;
(b) any county, other than Nassau County, for county purposes, 7%;
(c) New York City, for city purposes, 10%;
(d) any city, other than New York City, with a population greater than 125,000 according to
the latest federal census, for city purposes, 9%;
(e) any city having with a population of less than 125,000 according to the latest federal
census, for city purposes excluding education, 7%;
(f) any town, for town purposes, 7%; and
(g) any village for village purposes, 7%.
N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
52. City of Tucson v. Corbin, 623 P.2d 1239, 1244-45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Richards,
237 N.W.2d 48 at 65-66; Miller v. Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Ky. 1976);
Okla. City Urban Renewal Auth. v. Med. Tech. & Research Auth. of Okla., 4 P.3d 677, 684
(Okla. 2000); Meierhenry, 354 N.W.2d at 179; County Comm’n of Boone County v. Cooke,
475 S.E.2d 483, 493 (W. Va. 1996); City of Hartford v. Kirley, 493 N.W.2d 45, 55 (Wis.
1992).
53. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 21, at 45-47. South Dakota’s TIF statute does not
address the issue. Id. at 47.
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Oklahoma Supreme Court, “[s]tatutory declarations alone will not alter the
nature of indebtedness when circumstances make it clear that an obligation
has been incurred.” 54 Courts in the aforementioned states reasoned that,
because TIF bonds are repaid from property tax revenue, they implicate the
credit of the underlying municipality. For example, in Richards v.
Muscatine, 55 the Iowa Supreme Court held that “ultimately the ‘credit’ of a
city is its power to levy general taxes. When it pledges all or part of that
power, it pledges its credit and in a realistic sense incurs an obligation.”56
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin determined that TIF bonds
count against constitutional debt limits because “they are payable solely
from general property tax revenue.” 57 The court noted that it did not matter
that the tax increment might not have existed without the use of TIF. 58
Courts in the following states have taken the opposite view, instead
finding that TIF debt is not subject to constitutional debt limitations:
Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Missouri, South Carolina, and Utah. 59 In
making this determination, these courts relied on the special fund
doctrine. 60 Under the special fund doctrine, when bonds are repaid from
“special funds” rather than from a municipality’s general fund, those bonds
do not count toward the municipality’s constitutional debt limitation.61
With TIF projects, the special funds contain the increased tax revenue
generated by the projects. In Wolper v. City Council of Charleston, the
South Carolina Supreme Court noted that TIF debt is repaid from a special
fund containing the incremental property tax revenue from the TIF
district. 62 The court reasoned that, since TIF bondholders cannot look

54. Okla. City Urban Renewal Auth., 4 P.3d at 686; accord Kirley, 493 N.W.2d at 50
(“The legislature’s characterization of the bonds is not controlling on this court’s
determination of the constitutional issue.”); Meierhenry, 354 N.W.2d at 178
(“[N]otwithstanding the legislature’s characterization of the bonds, we must determine the
nature of the bonding transaction from what it is, and not from what it is called.”).
55. 237 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1975).
56. Id. at 64.
57. Kirley, 493 N.W.2d at 54.
58. Id.
59. See Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1382 (Colo. 1980); State
v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 899 (Fla. 1980); S. Bend Pub. Transp.
Corp. v. City of S. Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ind. 1981); Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n v.
J.E. Dunn Const., 781 S.W.2d 70, 77 (Mo. 1989); Wolper v. City Council of Charleston,
336 S.E.2d 871, 874 (S.C. 1985); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah
1975).
60. See Julie A Goshorn, Note, In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment Financing
Reform, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 937 n.94 (1999) (describing how the special fund doctrine is
used to avoid counting TIF bonds toward constitutional debt limits).
61. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 51, at 404.
62. 336 S.E.2d at 874.
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beyond this special fund for repayment, TIF bonds do not count toward
constitutional debt limitations. 63 The Supreme Court of Florida exercised
similar reasoning in State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency. 64 The
court emphasized that if the special fund did not contain sufficient revenues
to meet the bond obligations, TIF bondholders would have no recourse
against the municipality. 65 The court thus concluded that TIF debt should
not count toward the municipality’s constitutional debt limitation. 66
The application of the special fund doctrine to TIF is problematic. The
money funneled into these special funds is property tax revenue; “the
character of [the] revenue does not change.” 67 The Iowa Supreme Court
best explained the conflict that arises when the special fund doctrine is used
to exclude TIF debt from constitutional debt limitations:
Clearly the urban renewal bonds would constitute a constitutional debt if
they were payable from the general revenues of the city without
limitation. We think the result is not different because [the TIF statute]
carves out a certain portion of a city’s general revenues and limits the
liability of the city to those revenues. If the result were otherwise, a city
could divide its general revenues into several special funds, each with a
bond issue restricted to recourse against its own fund—and thus commit
large portions of the city’s revenues without regard to [the constitutional
debt limitation, which] could thus be virtually nullified. 68

The court realized that allowing the special fund argument to prevail would
perpetuate the creation of other special funds, resulting in the ongoing
circumvention of constitutional debt limits. It is true that counting TIF debt
toward the underlying municipality’s debt limit may preclude valuable
redevelopment projects. But the purpose of constitutional debt limitations
is “to prevent the creation of excessive municipal debt and to protect
taxpayers from the consequent oppression of burdensome, if not ruinous,
Thus, although some redevelopment may not get
taxation.” 69
accomplished, TIF debt should count toward constitutional debt limitations.
This best serves the long-term interests of the taxpayers.
2. Likely Outcome in New York
New York’s TIF statute expressly states that TIF debt does not count
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
392 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1980).
Id. at 898.
Id. at 898-99.
Goshorn, supra note 60, at 943.
Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48, 64 (Iowa 1975).
City of Hartford v. Kirley, 493 N.W.2d 45, 51 (Wis. 1992).
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toward the issuing municipality’s constitutional debt limit.70 As shown
above, such provisions are not controlling. 71 But New York’s TIF statute
was enacted pursuant to an amendment to the New York Constitution that
also expressly provides that TIF debt does not count toward constitutional
debt limits.72 This has been the deciding factor for courts in other states.
For example, in finding that TIF bonds do not count toward constitutional
debt limits, the South Carolina Supreme Court emphasized that the state
constitution explicitly authorizes the issuance of such bonds.73 Conversely,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that TIF bonds do count toward
Oklahoma’s constitutional debt limits, reasoning that Oklahoma’s enabling
amendment “contains no language impacting or altering” these limits.74
Given the express language of New York’s enabling amendment, a New
York court is not likely to find that TIF debt is subject to the constitutional
debt limitations.
B. Unlawful Diversion of School Tax Revenues
1. Generally
The diversion of property tax revenue to a TIF project can have a
detrimental financial impact on overlapping jurisdictions. In particular,
school districts are often affected because they generally receive large
amounts of property tax revenue. 75 As such, several state courts have
considered whether TIF unconstitutionally diverts tax revenue from school
districts. 76 Thus far, only courts in Kentucky and Washington have

70. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-o(g) (McKinney 2005).
71. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
72. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. The amendment provides that “the amount of any
indebtedness contracted under this section may be excluded in ascertaining the power of
such county, city, town or village to contract indebtedness within the provisions of this
constitution relating thereto.” Id.
73. Wolper v. City Council of Charleston, 336 S.E.2d 871, 874 (S.C. 1985). South
Carolina’s enabling amendment authorizes the issuance of TIF bonds but does not address
whether they will be subject to constitutional debt limits. S.C. CONST. art. X, §14(10). In
contrast, New York’s enabling amendment specifically provides that TIF debt will not be
subject to those limits. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
74. Okla. City Urban Renewal Auth. v. Med. Tech. & Research Auth. of Okla., 4 P.3d
677, 685 (Okla. 2000). Cf. County Comm’n of Boone County v. Cooke, 475 S.E.2d 483,
492 n.16 (W. Va. 1996) (reaching a similar conclusion).
75. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 21, at 49.
76. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242, 248-49 (Ill. 1980); Miller v.
Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Ky. 1976); Request for Advisory Opinion on the
Constitutionality of 1986 PA 281, 422 N.W.2d 186, 195 (Mich. 1988); City of El Paso v. El
Paso Cmty. Coll., 729 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. 1986); Leonard v. City of Spokane, 897 P.2d
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endorsed this argument. 77 Unlike other states, Kentucky and Washington
have special constitutional provisions that expressly prohibit the use of
school tax revenue for non-school purposes. 78 In Miller v. Covington
Development Authority, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that Kentucky’s
TIF statute violated this provision of the Kentucky Constitution. 79 The
court rejected the argument that, because the incremental revenue would
not have been raised without TIF, TIF was not diverting revenue that
belonged to the school district.80 The court was equally unmoved by the
argument that the use of TIF would eventually increase the school district’s
tax revenue by increasing its tax base. 81 The Washington Supreme Court,
citing Miller, reached the same conclusion in Leonard v. City of Spokane. 82
The specificity of Kentucky’s and Washington’s constitutional
provisions regarding the use of school tax revenue limits Miller’s and
Leonard’s applicability to other jurisdictions.83 Such provisions are not
common features of most states’ constitutions. For example, in City of
Canton v. Crouch, the Illinois Supreme Court held that “[t]he fact that our
constitution provides for no such limitation on education revenues, and in
fact encourages intergovernmental cooperation, compels us to reach the

358, 361-62 (Wash. 1995).
77. Miller, 539 S.W.2d at 5; Leonard, 897 P.2d at 361-62.
78. See KY. CONST. § 186; WASH. CONST. art 9, § 2. Section 186 of the Kentucky
Constitution states:
All funds accruing to the school fund shall be used for the maintenance of the
public schools of the Commonwealth, and for no other purpose, and the General
Assembly shall by general law prescribe the manner of the distribution of the
public school fund among the school districts and its use for public school
purposes.
KY. CONST. § 186. Washington’s Constitution contains a similar provision: “the entire
revenue derived from the common school fund and the state tax for common schools shall
be exclusively applied to the support of the common schools.” WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 2.
79. Miller, 539 S.W.2d at 5.
80. Id.
81. Id. The Kentucky legislature subsequently repealed Kentucky’s TIF statute in 1986.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 99.750-.765. It was replaced by the Kentucky Increment Financing
Act in July 2000. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 65.680-.699. The new statute remedies the
constitutional problem identified in Miller by expressly prohibiting the use of tax revenue
that would otherwise go to school districts. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.680.
82. 897 P.2d at 361 (holding that Washington’s TIF statute unconstitutionally diverted
tax revenues from schools in violation of the state constitution).
83. See, e.g., Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at 547 (“In light of the unique character of
the constitutional provision responsible for the demise of tax increment financing in
Kentucky, the case should be of limited precedential value.”); Joseph F. Luther, Comment,
Tax Increment Financing: Municipalities Avoiding Voter Accountability, 1987 DET. C.L.
REV. 89, 106-07 (1987) (“[T]he specificity of [Kentucky’s] constitutional provision may
have the effect of limiting the applicability of this case to other jurisdictions.”).
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conclusion that the decision in Miller has no application in this case.”84
The Michigan Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Request for
Advisory Opinion on the Constitutionality of 1986 PA 281, holding that
Miller did not apply because the Michigan Constitution does not contain a
similar restriction on education revenues.85
2. Likely Outcome in New York
School district taxes are not eligible for TIF bond repayment in New
York. 86 The constitutional amendment authorizing TIF legislation provides
that only the municipality that initiates the TIF project can allocate its
incremental tax revenue to a TIF fund. 87 The enabling amendment does
not authorize school districts to initiate TIF projects, which means that
school districts cannot allocate their tax revenue to a TIF fund.88
Therefore, the unlawful diversion of school tax revenue argument should
not arise in New York.
C. Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Power
1. Generally
Several courts have considered the legality of granting redevelopment
agencies power over the tax revenue of other taxing jurisdictions. Thus far,
only one court has found that TIF permits an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority. 89 In Miller v. Covington Development Authority, the
Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated Kentucky’s TIF statute 90 because it
84. 403 N.E.2d 242, 248-49 (Ill. 1980) (upholding the constitutionality of Illinois’ TIF
statute).
85. 422 N.W.2d 186, 195 (Mich. 1988).
86. See Winter, supra note 9, at 671-72.
87. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 provides:
[a]ny county, city, town or village contracting indebtedness pursuant to this
section for redevelopment of an economically unproductive, blighted or
deteriorated area shall pledge to the payment thereof that portion of the taxes
raised by it on real estate in such area which, in any year, is attributed to the
increase in value of taxable real estate resulting from such redevelopment.
88. Id. New York’s TIF statute also prohibits the use of school district taxes. The
statute authorizes the use of “real property taxes levied upon taxable real property in the
project area each year by or for the benefit of the municipality or municipalities” that
approved the redevelopment plan. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-p(a) (McKinney 2005).
Section 970-c(e) defines a municipality as “a city, village, town or a county other than a
county located wholly within a city.” Since the definition of “municipality” does not
include school districts, school district taxes cannot be allocated to the TIF fund.
89. Miller v. Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Ky. 1976).
90. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 99.750-.770 (repealed 1986).
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granted too much authority to independent redevelopment agencies.91 The
court reasoned that legislative power should be exercised by elected
representatives and not by administrative agencies. 92 The court concluded
that Kentucky’s TIF statute improperly delegated legislative power by
permitting redevelopment agencies to create TIF districts without prior
approval from the local governing body. 93
Despite its success in Kentucky, all other courts that have heard the
unlawful delegation argument have rejected it. 94 For example, in Tribe v.
Salt Lake City Corp., the Utah Supreme Court determined that a
redevelopment agency only offends the constitution when the agency has
powers that “intrude into areas of purely municipal concern.”95 The court
found that the state legislature has the authority “to grant [such an agency]
any powers, not expressly prohibited by the constitution, to further such
[state] purposes, including the power of taxation.” 96 After characterizing
the elimination of blight as a state concern, the court held that Utah’s TIF
statute did not improperly delegate legislative power to a redevelopment
agency. 97 Similarly, in Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project 1B v.
Goldman, 98 the California Supreme Court determined that a redevelopment
agency is “entitled to exercise the powers delegated to it when functioning
under the state law to fulfill the specifically enunciated state purposes.” 99

91. Miller, 539 S.W.2d at 4-5. The Miller Court invalidated Kentucky’s Tax Increment
Act for two reasons, the first of which is discussed above. See supra notes 77-81 and
accompanying text.
92. Miller, 539 S.W.2d at 4 (“If there is one essential characteristic inherent in
legislative power, it is that such power must be exercised by an elected representative or
representatives of the people, and not by a person, persons or agency created or designated
by those representatives.”).
93. Id. at 2.
94. See Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project 1B v. Goldman, 389 P.2d 538, 573 (Cal.
1964); Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105, 124 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1954); Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1386 (Colo. 1980); S.
Bend Pub. Transp. Corp. v. City of S. Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217, 224-25 (Ind. 1981); Richards
v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48, 56-57 (Iowa 1975); State ex rel. Schneider v. City of
Topeka, 605 P.2d 556, 563 (Kan. 1980); City of Sparks v. Best, 605 P.2d 638, 640 (Nev.
1980); Meierhenry v. City of Huron, 354 N.W.2d 171, 183 (S.D. 1984); Metro. Dev. &
Hous. Agency v. Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tenn. 1979); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
540 P.2d 499, 507 (Utah 1975).
95. Tribe, 540 P.2d at 503.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 389 P.2d 538 (Cal. 1964).
99. Id. at 571; accord Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105,
124 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (noting that the state legislature “may, where necessary,
confer authority and discretion in connection with the execution of the law; it may establish
primary standards and impose upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative
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The court concluded that, because elimination of blight is a specifically
declared state purpose, California’s TIF statute did not unconstitutionally
delegate legislative power to redevelopment agencies.100
2. Likely Outcome in New York
New York’s TIF statute expressly defines the elimination of blight as a
state goal: “it is declared to be the policy of the state to protect and promote
the sound development and redevelopment of blighted areas.”101 The
powers granted to redevelopment agencies by New York’s TIF statute are
inexorably connected to this state objective. Because a redevelopment
agency that operates pursuant to New York’s TIF statute is furthering a
state purpose, a New York court is likely to reject the unlawful delegation
argument. Moreover, the New York Court of Appeals has stated that,
“[p]articularly [when a] statute concerns public financing programs, courts
are required to exercise restraint and give deference to the legislative
enactment.” 102 Thus, a New York court is likely to defer to the legislature
and uphold the TIF statute in the face of an unlawful delegation of
authority challenge.
III. RISKS OF TIF
Although many TIF projects have been successful, there are several
potential risks that a municipality should consider before implementing a
TIF project. This section describes these risks and then considers whether
TIF really is a self-financing mechanism, as its proponents argue.
A. Impact of TIF Debt on the Underlying Municipality
TIF bonds are more expensive than general obligation bonds. 103 Unlike
general obligation debt, TIF debt is not backed by the “faith and credit” of
the underlying municipality. 104 Therefore, TIF debt is riskier than general

policy in accordance with the general provisions of the act”) (quoting Belovsky v.
Redevelopment Auth., 54 A.2d 277, 283 (Pa. 1947)).
100. Bunker Hill, 389 P.2d at 573.
101. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-b (McKinney 2005).
102. Local Gov’t Assistance Corp. v. Sales Tax Asset Receivable Corp., 813 N.E.2d 587,
594 (N.Y. 2004).
103. See Craig L. Johnson, The Use of Debt in Tax Increment Financing, in TAX
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 71,
77 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001); George Lefcoe, When Governments
Become Land Developers: Notes on the Public-Sector Experience in The Netherlands and
California, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 165, 253 (1978).
104. See DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 23, at 2. New York’s TIF statute expressly
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obligation debt and thus generally warrants a higher interest rate.105
Although TIF debt requires a higher interest rate than general obligation
debt specifically because it is not backed by the underlying municipalities’
faith and credit, 106 underlying municipalities almost always prefer to bail
out TIF bonds rather than allow them to default. 107 Generally, when
implementing a TIF project, the underlying municipality will create a
redevelopment agency that is a “legally separate and distinct entit[y]” to
issue TIF debt. 108 The municipality is not legally required to make debt
service payments if the agency fails to pay. 109 If the municipality does not
cure the agency’s default, however, the rating agencies may downgrade the
For example, when the
municipality’s general obligation debt.110
Englewood Urban Renewal Authority of Englewood, Colorado defaulted
on a twenty-seven million dollar TIF bond issue, Moody’s downgraded
Englewood’s general obligation debt rating. 111 In its explanatory report,
Moody’s cited the “inextricable financial links among the city, the
authority and the city’s unwillingness to follow through on its capital
projects, regardless of how the debt that financed the project is ultimately
secured.” 112 Because of the risk to the municipality’s credit rating, the
municipality has tremendous incentive to bail out TIF bonds. 113 According
to Economic Research Associates, when TIF bonds have come close to
default, most local governments have provided the needed funds.114

provides that TIF bonds may not be secured by the “faith and credit” of the local
government. § 970-o(b).
105. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 103, at 77.
106. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
108. Johnson, supra note 103, at 81.
109. Id.
110. See id. (“Nevertheless, the nonrepayment of TIF debt can have an adverse impact on
the general government’s general obligation debt.”).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., GARY L. SULLIVAN ET AL., INSTIT. FOR POLICY & ECON. DEV., UNIV. OF
TEX. AT EL PASO, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING BEST PRACTICES STUDY FOR GREATER EL
PASO
CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE
3
(2002),
available
at
http://iped.utep.edu/IPED%20Reports/tr2002-10/tr2002-10.pdf.
114. DAVID A. WILCOX & DAVID E. VERSEL, ECON. RES. ASS’N, REVIEW OF BEST
PRACTICES FOR TAX-INCREMENT FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1999), available at
http://www.econres.com/documents/issue_papers/issue_era_6_TIF_bestpractices.pdf; see
also deMause, Scrounging, supra note 17 (“TIF bonds traditionally use a city’s general fund
as a backup revenue source.”). For example, in 1984 when two of Minneapolis’ TIF
districts failed to generate sufficient revenue to repay their TIF debt, the city made up the
difference. See John Kemanski, Using Tax Increment Financing for Urban Development
Projects, 4 ECON. DEV. Q. 23, 26 (1990).
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Default generally is “the option of last resort.” 115
B. Revenue Shortfalls and Cost Overruns
Before implementing a TIF project, a municipality needs to consider
how difficult it is to estimate accurately project revenues and costs.
Various factors can cause revenue shortfalls and cost overruns, and
inaccurate predictions may, in turn, jeopardize the TIF debt. First, the TIF
project might not attract the projected level of private development.116 In
addition, labor strikes, changes in market conditions, interest rate increases,
and harsh weather conditions can halt or delay development. 117 Second,
assessed property values in a TIF district may decline rather than
increase. 118 In a TIF district in St. Petersburg, Florida, the taxable property
value declined roughly twenty-five percent below its pre-TIF assessment
due to recession. 119 The city used existing taxes to bailout the project.120
Third, tax abatements can reduce the tax base.121 When a municipality
uses property tax abatements to attract developers, it risks lower-thananticipated tax increments if the abatements are not properly factored into
the TIF projections. 122 For example, taxable property values in some
Michigan TIF districts declined from their base values because of the
concurrent granting of tax abatements in those districts.123 Finally, some
project costs are difficult to foresee.124 For example, Greenburgh, New
York used eminent domain to displace some residents in its TIF district,
and one of these residents sued over the price he received for his
property. 125 As a result of this unexpected litigation, Greenburgh
accumulated sizeable legal costs that it had not factored into its
projections. 126

115. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1028.
116. DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 23, at 4.
117. See, e.g., Klacik & Nunn, supra note 7, at 25; STANDARD & POOR’S, PUBLIC
FINANCE CRITERIA 54 (2000) (on file with author).
118. DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 23, at 4.
119. Id.
120. See deMause, Scrounging, supra note 17.
121. See Klacik & Nunn, supra note 7, at 25.
122. Id. For more information on the relationship between TIF and tax abatement, see
infra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
123. DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 23, at 4.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
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C. Cost Spillovers
The development associated with a TIF project is likely to generate
increased demand for government services (such as education, fire, police,
sanitation, and transportation) in the TIF district. 127 The property taxes
paid to the municipality by property owners in the TIF district likely will
not cover the cost of these new services. 128 And, the incremental tax
revenue generated by the new development cannot be used to cover these
costs. 129 The redevelopment agency will continue to funnel the increment
into a special fund until all the TIF bonds are retired—even if the increment
is higher than expected. 130 The local taxing bodies may wait many years
before that portion of the tax base becomes available. In the meantime, the
municipality may have to increase taxes or dip into its general fund to pay
for these services. 131 As a result, taxpayers outside the TIF district often
wind up subsidizing TIF projects. 132
Some commentators argue that increased sales tax revenue from the new
commercial growth in the TIF district will offset any indirect subsidies.133
This argument is flawed. Although the development may increase the
supply of retail stores, it does not follow that the demand for retail goods
will also increase. 134 As such, there is no guarantee that sales tax revenue
will increase to a point where it offsets contributions made by taxpayers
outside the TIF district. Commentators have also argued that as property
values increase in the TIF district, adjacent landowners will experience a
corresponding increase in property values that compensates them for their
contributions to the TIF project.135 But it is almost impossible to determine
when, where, and even whether such increase will occur. 136 Moreover, if

127. E.g., Frank S. London, The Use of Tax Increment Financing to Attract Private
Investment and Generate Redevelopment in Virginia, 20 VA. TAX REV. 777, 809 (2001).
128. Recall that, for the life of the TIF project, the original taxing authorities only receive
taxes on the base assessed value of properties in the TIF district. See supra notes 10-14 and
accompanying text.
129. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that the original taxing authorities
do not get any of the tax increment until the TIF bonds are repaid).
130. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. New York’s TIF statute provides that the
tax increment does not revert to the municipality until all the TIF debt has been repaid.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-p(a)(ii) (McKinney 2005).
131. See, e.g., Michel, supra note 9, at 469.
132. DONALD G. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 187 (Supp. 1976).
133. See, e.g., Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at 542.
134. See Lefcoe, supra note 103, at 259.
135. See Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at 542.
136. See David A. Hegg, Tax-Increment Financing of Urban Renewal – Redevelopment
Incentive Without Federal Assistance, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 575, 578 (1973).
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the use of TIF is not limited, it can extend indefinitely and thus never return
the benefits to the taxpayers who subsidized the redevelopment.137
D. Lack of Voter Accountability
TIF allows local governments to act without accountability to voters.138
Most TIF statutes do not require voter approval prior to the adoption of the
redevelopment plan or prior to the issuance of TIF bonds. 139 Local
governments essentially have free reign over TIF projects, which increases
the likelihood of abuse.140 Chief Justice Henriod of the Utah Supreme
Court best articulated the lack of voter accountability argument in his
dissent in Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp.:
Powerful interests are now free to inveigh upon politically sensitive and
possibly over-sold public officials to induce the expenditure of public
funds in all sorts of development schemes, with no voter control but with
voter liability if the development fails to produce the needed revenues
and/or taxes to repay the bonds . . . . 141

Henriod points out that this freedom from voter approval may entice local
officials to abuse TIF. Because voter approval is not required, local
officials can use taxpayers’ money for TIF “under almost any
circumstance.” 142 Moreover, because TIF funds do not originate from the
municipality’s capital budget, local officials have less incentive to review
TIF expenditures as closely as they review budgetary items. 143 Taxpayers
are disadvantaged by the lack of voting power because, as Henriod
indicates, they are the ultimate repayers of the TIF debt if the project fails
to produce the anticipated tax revenue.
TIF proponents argue that TIF statutes generally contain adequate
safeguards to protect taxpayers from abuse.144 In particular, some
137. See HAGMAN, supra note 132, at 187.
138. E.g., Luther, supra note 83, at 117 (arguing that “[e]limination of voter
accountability is the inherent defect in tax increment financing”).
139. See, e.g., Man, supra note 18, at 93. For example, under New York’s TIF statute,
the municipality must file an annual progress report with the State Comptroller, but voter
approval is not required for project plans or bond issues. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-q
(McKinney 2005). In contrast, most states have public referendum requirements for
traditional general obligation debt. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 51, at 389.
140. See Luther, supra note 83, at 117.
141. 540 P.2d 499, 515 (Utah 1975) (Henriod, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Henriod
also determined that “the taxpayers no longer have referendum control over the decisions of
municipal bodies to extend money for capital improvements in any area which arbitrarily is
labeled ‘blighted,’ whether it is blighted or not.” Id. at 514.
142. London, supra note 127, at 810.
143. See Winter, supra note 9, at 682.
144. E.g., Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at 541.
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commentators argue that the public notice and hearing requirements
contained in most TIF statutes ensure that the public has a voice in the TIF
decision. 145 In response, one critic rightly argues that “[p]ublic notice in a
newspaper that a municipality is considering the implementation of tax
increment financing is unlikely to raise the eyebrow of an attorney or
accountant, much less the average public.” 146 And even if taxpayers do
take notice, the hearings themselves do not provide taxpayers with any real
decision-making authority. 147 Although taxpayers may challenge a TIF
plan at a public hearing, the legislative body is not required to respond. For
example, New York’s TIF statute just requires the legislative body to “hear
and consider” the public comments; the legislature does not have to make
any changes to the redevelopment plan in response to public objection.148
Another TIF proponent contends that the public hearings at least enable
voters to make informed decisions about their elected officials at upcoming
elections. 149 But this overlooks the fact that many TIF projects are
administered by redevelopment agencies consisting of officials who are
appointed rather than elected. 150 Elected officials effectively are protected
against negative voter reaction to TIF projects.151 Thus, taxpayers
essentially are left without a voice in the process. Such a result seems
unfair, given that taxpayers are the ultimate repayers of TIF debt. 152

145. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 10, at 439; London, supra note 127, at 812. Only
seven states (Alaska, Delaware, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Ohio and Rhode
Island) do not require public hearings prior to either plan approval or district creation. Of
the forty-eight states that had enacted TIF statutes by 1997, only six did not have public
hearing requirements. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 21, at 42. Subsequently, the remaining
two states, North Carolina and Delaware, passed TIF statutes. See supra note 21. North
Carolina’s TIF statute requires the issuing municipality’s governing body to hold a public
hearing before adopting the redevelopment plan. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.3 (2005).
Delaware’s Municipal Tax Increment Financing Act, however, does not appear to require a
public hearing. DEL. CODE tit. 22, §§ 1701-1715 (2005).
For a discussion of New York’s public hearing requirement, see supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text.
146. Luther, supra note 83, at 118.
147. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 10, at 440 (“If an issue does arise at this stage, it is
likely to be treated as an administrative matter that does not require the same level of
formalized citizen input.”).
148. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-h(d) (McKinney 2005).
149. London, supra note 127, at 812.
150. See HAGMAN, supra note 132, at 187; Kemanski, supra note 114, at 25 (noting that
the creation of redevelopment agencies “raises the problem of accountability . . . in which
decisions concerning millions of dollars are made by individuals who most often are not
elected by voters”).
151. See Kemanski, supra note 114, at 25.
152. See Johnson, supra note 103, at 78.
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E. Are TIF Projects Really Self-Financing?
The argument that TIF is a self-financing redevelopment mechanism,
often advanced by TIF supporters, is misleading. 153 In reality, TIF projects
often impose considerable costs on taxpayers. If the anticipated tax
revenue does not materialize, the underlying municipality likely will raise
taxes or dip into its general fund to service and repay the TIF debt.154
Moreover, an increased demand for city services often accompanies the
redevelopment; thus, taxpayers outside the TIF district may be forced to
pay higher taxes to cover the cost of these services. 155 Finally, there is
always some possibility that the development would have occurred without
the use of TIF. 156 If this is the case, then the tax increment also would have
occurred—meaning that the original taxing authorities unnecessarily
subsidized the redevelopment.157
Because many of TIF’s costs are “hidden and may occur years later,”
taxpayers likely will not be able to discern the true costs of TIF projects.158
When local officials praise TIF projects as self-financing, they mislead
their constituents, giving them a false impression of TIF and its associated
costs. When a city’s general fund is ultimately responsible for the debt
should the project fail, it is improper to assert otherwise. Thus, local
officials should stop billing TIF projects as self-financing. Instead, they
should provide accurate explanations of the pros and cons of TIF, so that
their constituents can develop accurate opinions about its merits.
IV. FINANCING DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK
This section considers TIF’s scarcity in New York and proposes a
potential explanation. It then describes the intended use of PILOT
financing to develop Manhattan’s Far West Side. It examines the structural
and conceptual similarities between PILOT financing and TIF and explains
how the legal issues and policy considerations surrounding the use of TIF
apply with equal force to PILOT financing. Finally, it applies the lessons
learned from TIF to PILOT financing and, based on those lessons,
recommends some changes to the PILOT financing of the Far West Side
development.

153. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
154. See supra Parts III.A-B.
155. For further discussion of these cost spillovers, see supra Part III.C.
156. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 188.
157. Id. Yet “it is impossible to know what level of development would have occurred in
the absence of TIF.” Id.
158. Michel, supra note 9, at 469.
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A. The Use of TIF in New York
There are only two reported uses of TIF in all of New York thus far.159
The town of Victor in Ontario County issued approximately eight million
dollars in TIF bonds in 1994 to help finance the renovation and expansion
of a local shopping mall, 160 while the town of Greenburgh in Westchester
County issued roughly $770,000 in TIF debt between 1990 and 1993 to
fund road improvements. 161
New York’s heavy reliance on tax abatement may explain its scant use
of TIF. 162 Tax abatement programs attempt to attract private development
by exempting developers from paying real property taxes for a certain
number of years. 163 In New York State, municipalities are authorized to
grant tax abatements for up to twenty-five years for residential property.164

159. Under section 970-q of New York’s TIF statute, a municipality employing TIF must
submit an annual progress report to the State Comptroller. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-q
(McKinney 2005). According to the Office of the State Comptroller, their records do not
indicate that any other local government, besides Victor and Greenburgh, has filed a report
pursuant to section 970-q. Telephone Interview with Office of the State Comptroller (Feb.
10, 2005).
160. Telephone Interview with Michael J. Dollard, Town Manager of Victor (Feb. 4,
2005). According to Dollard, the redevelopment boosted Victor’s economy; Victor’s sales
tax revenue increased almost 270% in the wake of the mall project. Id.
161. Telephone Interview with Doreen Muentener, Deputy Comptroller of Greenburgh
(Feb. 10, 2005). Greenburgh issued $660,500 in 1990, $135,000 in 1992, and $95,000 in
1993. Id. For more information on Greenburgh’s TIF project, see supra notes 125-126 and
accompanying text.
162. See Winter, supra note 9, at 693 (noting that “the traditionally indiscriminate use of
tax abatements in New York may discourage municipalities and developers from even
bothering with tax increment financing”).
163. E.g., Winter, supra note 9, at 691.
164. Section 421-a of New York’s Real Property Tax Law provides graded exemptions
for newly constructed residential multiple dwellings (defined as three or more families
living independently of one another). N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney
2005). The duration of the exemption ranges from ten to twenty-five years, based on project
location and affordability. Id. Section 421-b provides an eight-year graded exemption for
newly constructed or reconstructed one- and two-family homes. § 421-b. Section 421-c
provides a graded exemption of up to ten years for new residential multiple dwellings in
towns, villages, and cities with less than one million residents. § 421-c. Section 421-e
provides a twenty-year graded exemption on cooperatives, condominiums, homesteading or
rental projects that receive payments pursuant to Article 18 of the private housing finance
law. § 421-e. New York City in particular runs an extensive tax abatement program. E.g.,
Michael J. Wolkoff, The Nature of Property Tax Abatement Awards, 49 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N
77, 80 (1983). According to the New York City Independent Budget Office (IBO), over the
last five years approximately 1,200 units with ten-year exemptions and 1,300 units with
twenty-year exemptions have been added annually. N.Y. CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE,
BUDGET OPTIONS FOR NEW YORK CITY 56 (2005), at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us. The IBO
estimates that the full cost in foregone property tax revenues is roughly $22,000 per unit
with a ten-year exemption and $91,000 per unit with a twenty-year exemption. Id. at 56.
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Similar abatement schemes exist for non-residential property. 165 Because
TIF depends on new property tax revenue, it essentially precludes the use
of tax abatement programs as incentives to attract private development.166
If developers are given tax breaks, there will be less incremental tax
revenue to collect. 167
B. The Use of PILOT Financing in New York
New York’s limited use of TIF is somewhat misleading, because the
Bloomberg Administration recently initiated a substantial development
project in New York City (“the City”) that uses PILOT financing, a close
variant of TIF.
1. Description of the Far West Side Development
The development of Manhattan’s Far West Side will occur in two
phases. 168 Phase I calls for the extension of the Number Seven subway line
from Times Square west to Eleventh Avenue; the construction of a
platform over the Eastern Rail Yards; the formation of a new street system,
including “Hudson Boulevard,” a mid-block street running north-south

Between 1971 and 2002, the 421-a exemption helped finance the construction of 87,000
apartments in New York City. N.Y. CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, WORTH THE COST?
EVALUATING THE 421-A PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION 1 (2003), at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us.
The Department of Finance estimates that the use of the 421-a program in New York City
resulted in $130 million in foregone tax revenue in 2002 alone. Id.
165. Section 485-a of New York’s Real Property Tax Law provides for a twelve-year
graded exemption for non-residential property converted to mixed-use property in a
municipality with less than one million inhabitants. § 485-a. Section 485-b provides for a
ten-year graded exemption on real property “constructed, altered, installed or improved . . .
for the purpose of commercial, business or industrial activity.” § 485-b.
166. HAGMAN, supra note 132, at 187.
167. TIF and property tax abatement programs have different benefits, which may
explain why some municipalities prefer TIF and others prefer tax abatements. One benefit
of tax abatement programs is that the cost of the abatement is borne solely by the particular
jurisdiction that gives the subsidy. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 189. In contrast,
overlapping jurisdictions often bear some of the costs associated with TIF. See supra Part
III.C. Tax abatement is also less complicated than TIF. Winter, supra note 9, at 692. The
municipality does not have to designate a specific TIF district and divert incremental tax
revenues to a special fund. Some municipalities prefer TIF over tax abatement programs,
however, because they believe that TIF is a self-financing mechanism that stimulates
development without direct subsidies. See Man, supra note 18, at 94.
168. See CITY OF N.Y. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PRESENTATION OF HUDSON YARDS
INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION FINANCING PLAN TO CITY PLANNING COMMISSION (July 12,
2004), at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/hyards/financing_for_cpc.pdf [hereinafter
HUDSON YARDS PRESENTATION]; see also COMM. ON FIN., N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, REPORT OF
THE FINANCE DIVISION: PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005 (Jan. 19, 2005) (on file
with author) [hereinafter PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005].
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between Tenth and Eleventh Avenues from West Thirty-third Street to
West Thirty-ninth Street; and the creation of a six-acre park over the
Eastern Rail Yards Platform and a network of parks along the new Hudson
Boulevard. 169 Phase II consists of the construction of a subway station at
Forty-first Street for the Number Seven line and the construction of the
northern blocks of Hudson Boulevard. 170 According to a report by the City
Council’s Finance Division, Phase I will cost approximately $2.8 billion
and Phase II will cost roughly $775 million. 171
2. Financing the Far West Side Development
The City initially considered using traditional TIF to finance the Far
West Side development. In 2001, the Department of City Planning
published a report that outlined a comprehensive development plan and
proposed the use of TIF. 172 Subsequently, many groups, including the
NYC2012 Olympic Committee, submitted proposals advocating the use of
TIF. 173 Although the City ultimately decided not to use “a classic TIF,” it
is using a close variant that shares many of TIF’s conceptually important
features. 174
To finance Phase I, the Bloomberg Administration created the Hudson
Yards Infrastructure Corporation (“HYIC”), a non-profit local development
corporation. 175 The HYIC will issue thirty-year bonds backed by revenue
169. See HUDSON YARDS PRESENTATION, supra note 168.
170. See id.
171. PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005, supra note 168. According to the
report, Phase II can be deferred until future development produces the need and financial
resources for the infrastructure. Id.
172. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, CITY OF N.Y., FAR WEST MIDTOWN: A FRAMEWORK FOR
DEVELOPMENT 61 (2001), at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/pub/fwmt.pdf.
173. DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 23, at 2; see also Michael McDonald, IBO Leery of
N.Y. City TIF District, BOND BUYER, Mar. 13, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter McDonald, IBO
Leery] (describing how the City initially planned to use TIF to pay for the Far West Side
development).
174. McDonald, IBO Leery, supra note 173, at 1; see also Neil deMause, The Jets’ End
Run, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 16, 2004, at 20 (remarking that “[t]he effect [of the Far West
Side financing] would be exactly the same [as TIF]”); Matthew Strozier, How to Pay for the
Far West Side, REAL DEAL, May 2004 (referring to the Far West Side financing as a “TIFstyle arrangement”).
175. The HYIC was created pursuant to section 1411 of New York’s Not-for-Profit
Corporation Law, which authorizes the creation of local development corporations. Section
1411-a provides:
Corporations may be incorporated or reincorporated under this section as not-forprofit local development corporations operated for the exclusively charitable or
public purposes of relieving and reducing unemployment, promoting and
providing for additional and maximum employment, bettering and maintaining job
opportunities, instructing or training individuals to improve or develop their
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expected to be generated by the development. 176 Payments in lieu of taxes
(“PILOTs”) from new commercial buildings and residential property taxes
together will provide more than eighty-five percent of the revenues.177
Payments received from the sale of development rights over the Eastern
Rail Yard and contributions to the District Improvement Fund (in exchange
for development bonuses) will contribute roughly ten to twelve percent.178
The remaining money will come from the sale of publicly-owned land and
payments in lieu of sales taxes on construction materials.179
3. PILOT Financing: A TIF-Like Arrangement
PILOTs made by private developers represent the primary source of
expected revenue for the Far West Side development. By 2015, PILOTs
will contribute over forty percent of total revenue, and more than half of
the total revenue is expected to come from PILOTs after 2020. 180
The City has never issued bonds backed by payments in lieu of taxes
before, 181 and they are a rare structure in the municipal debt markets.182
But, PILOT financing is conceptually and structurally similar to TIF. As a
result, the legal issues, risks, and policy considerations surrounding the use
of TIF apply with equal force to PILOT financing.
a. How Does PILOT Financing Work?
Under the Far West Side plan, private developers planning to develop in
capabilities for such jobs, carrying on scientific research for the purpose of aiding
a community or geographic area by attracting new industry to the community or
area or by encouraging the development of, or retention of, an industry in the
community or area, and lessening the burdens of government and acting in the
public interest.
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1411-a (McKinney 2005). Section 1411-c authorizes
local development corporations to borrow money and issue bonds. §1411-c. According to
the IBO, “[a]lthough there are no explicit plans for financing Phase 2, the anticipated
revenues are intended to ultimately cover all project costs, including Phase 2 financing.”
DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 2.
176. See PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005, supra note 168. The bonds will be
issued from 2005 to 2011. Id.
177. See id.
178. See id.; HUDSON YARDS PRESENTATION, supra note 168.
179. See HUDSON YARDS PRESENTATION, supra note 168.
180. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 4.
181. See McDonald, West Side Bonds, supra note 5. But PILOTs (as opposed to PILOTbacked bonds) are not a new phenomenon. New York City received roughly $209 million
in PILOTs in 2004. See COMM. ON FIN., N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE FINANCE
DIVISION: PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005 (Mar. 22, 2005) (on file with author)
[hereinafter PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005].
182. Id.
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the Hudson Yards will have the option of entering into PILOT agreements
with the City’s Industrial Development Agency (“IDA”). 183 Under these
agreements, the IDA will purchase the land from the developers.184 This
removes the land from the property tax rolls, because the IDA is a taxexempt entity. 185 The developers will then make payments in lieu of
regular property taxes to the IDA for the duration of the agreement.186
These payments are generally less than the amount of real property taxes
that would otherwise be due. 187 Presumably, the IDA will funnel these
payments into a special fund overseen by the HYIC. The HYIC will then
use the special fund to make interest and principal payments on the project
bonds. At the end of the contract period, the IDA will return the land to the
developers and the developers thereafter will pay taxes to the City rather
than making payments to the IDA. 188
b. Structural Similarities Between PILOT Financing and TIF
TIF and PILOT financing have the same basic structure. Under both, a
redevelopment agency issues bonds and uses the proceeds to finance public
improvements. The public improvements are expected to increase property
values and generate new property tax revenue.189 Instead of going into the

183. The IDA is a public benefit corporation created under section 917 of the New York
General Municipal Law. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 917 (McKinney 2005). Section 917
provides:
[i]t is the policy and intent of the City of New York to promote the economic
welfare of its inhabitants and to actively promote, attract, encourage and develop
economically sound commerce and industry through governmental action for the
purpose of preventing unemployment and economic deterioration by the creation
of a New York City Industrial Development Agency.
Id.
184. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 3.
185. E.g., Joshua P. Rubin, Take the Money and Stay: Industrial Location Incentives and
Relational Contracting, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1277, 1303 n.162 (1995).
186. Id. Section 854 (17) of New York’s General Municipal Law defines payments in
lieu of taxes as “any payment made to an agency, or affected tax jurisdiction equal to the
amount, or a portion of, real property taxes, or other taxes, which would have been levied by
or on behalf of an affected jurisdiction if the project was not tax exempt by reason of agency
involvement.” § 854(17). Section 858 authorizes the IDA to enter into PILOT agreements.
§ 858. The IBO believes that the PILOT agreements will have a thirty-year term. DEVINE,
COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 3.
187. PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005, supra note 181.
188. Id.
189. See DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 6 (PILOT financing uses “property
tax revenue and the proceeds from the sale of new development rights that result from
public investment in infrastructure to pay for the infrastructure”); see also supra note 11 and
accompanying text (noting that public improvements should increase property values and
property taxes) .
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municipality’s general fund, this new tax revenue goes into a special
fund. 190 The redevelopment agency then uses the money in the special
fund to service and repay the project debt. In theory, neither TIF nor
PILOT projects take money from the municipality’s general fund. 191
Although similar, TIF and PILOT financing are not identical. Under
TIF, private developers own the project land, whereas under the West Side
plan the IDA will own the land until the PILOT agreements expire.192
Moreover, with TIF, all incremental tax revenue from the TIF district flows
into a special fund maintained by a redevelopment agency. 193 In contrast,
with the West Side’s PILOT financing, only payments made under PILOT
agreements will go into a special fund. All taxes collected on non-PILOT
properties will continue to go to the City’s general fund. 194
c. Potential Legal Challenges to PILOT Financing
Given the similarities between TIF and PILOT financing, the PILOT
financing of the Far West Side development could face some of the same
legal challenges that TIF has already faced.
i. PILOT Bonds and Constitutional Debt Limits
The Bloomberg Administration does not intend to count the PILOTbacked debt toward the City’s constitutional debt limit. 195 As explained
above, the PILOT bonds will be issued by the HYIC, a local development
corporation created pursuant to section 1411 of New York’s Not-for-Profit
Section 1411 authorizes not-for-profit local
Corporation Law. 196
development corporations like the HYIC to borrow money and issue
190. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining that the tax increment
collected from TIF projects flows into a special fund).
191. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of how TIF
proponents argue that TIF projects are self-financing. Similarly, proponents of the Far West
Side financing plan argue that the project will pay for itself. See, e.g., DIVINE, COMPLEX
STORY, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that PILOT financing does not draw directly on general
fund revenue); Charles V. Bagli, West Side Plan is Risky Effort, Forecasters Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter Bagli, Risky Effort] (quoting Deputy Mayor Daniel
Doctoroff as saying that the West Side development “pays for itself with new revenues it
will generate—not with capital budget money”); Strozier, supra note 174 (describing the
West Side project as “financially self-supporting”).
192. See supra notes 184-188 and accompanying text (explaining how PILOT financing
works).
193. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
194. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 12.
195. Id. at 6. Under New York’s Constitution, New York City can only issue debt up to
10% of its average full valuation of taxable real estate property. N.Y. CONST. art VIII, § 4.
196. See supra note 175-176 and accompanying text.
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bonds, 197 but it does not address whether such bonds will be considered a
debt of the underlying municipality. The Far West Side plan, however,
provides that interest payments on the HYIC debt may come from the
City’s general fund. 198 Given that the City has express authority to pay the
interest on the debt, the debt should count toward the City’s constitutional
debt limitation.
The Administration likely will rely on the special fund doctrine to
support its position that the PILOT bonds do not count toward that limit.199
The application of the special fund doctrine to PILOT-backed bonds is
problematic, just as it is with TIF bonds. 200 If the IDA did not purchase the
land from the developers (which removes the land from the property tax
rolls), then the developers would still be paying property taxes to the City.
Thus, even though the PILOTs will be funneled into a special fund, the
fund will contain property tax revenue. Because the special fund contains
tax revenue, it implicates the City’s credit.
Given that the PILOT bonds will be repaid from tax revenue, they
should count toward the City’s constitutional debt limit.
ii. Unlawful Diversion of School Tax Revenues
As with TIF projects, 201 PILOT financing projects may divert tax
revenue from school districts. The City’s school district is not an
independent taxing jurisdiction. Rather, it is fiscally dependent, meaning
that it depends on tax revenue from the City’s general fund for support.202
Because the HYIC bonds will be repaid out of tax revenue that otherwise
would go to the City’s general fund, the Far West Side’s PILOT financing
has the potential to draw revenue away from City schools.
iii. Unlawful Delegation of Authority
The significant delegation issue under the Far West Side’s PILOT
197. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 2005).
198. See infra note 214.
199. For an explanation of the special fund doctrine, see supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
200. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing the problem with using
the special fund doctrine to avoid counting TIF debt toward constitutional debt limits).
201. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
202. OFFICE OF MGMT. SERVS., N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, SCHOOL FINANCE IN NEW YORK
STATE (1999), at http://www.oms.nysed.gov/faru/Primer/primeintro.htm. In New York
State, all but five school districts are separate from municipal governments. Id. The
exceptions are the five cities whose populations exceed 125,000: New York City, Buffalo,
Rochester, Syracuse, and Yonkers. Id. In these five cities, education is part of the
municipal budget. Id.
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financing plan concerns the Mayor’s intention to appropriate PILOTs
without prior approval from the City Council.203 The Mayor unilaterally
authorized the IDA to transfer the PILOTs to the HYIC . This violates the
City Charter, which requires the Mayor to seek legislative approval before
appropriating public funds. 204 This also violates New York State’s General
Municipal Law, which requires the IDA to remit PILOTs to the affected tax
jurisdictions within thirty days of receipt.205 Therefore, an unlawful
delegation of authority challenge to the Mayor’s appropriation of PILOTs
could arise in a New York court. 206
d. Risks Shared by PILOT Financing and TIF
The Far West Side’s PILOT financing and TIF are both billed as selffinancing development mechanisms. 207 As shown above (in relation to
TIF), several risks accompany projects that claim to be self-financing. 208
These risks apply with equal force to projects backed by PILOT
financing. 209

203. See, e.g., PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005, supra note 181.
204. Press Release, N.Y. City Council, Speaker Miller Introduces Legislation to Stop
Mayor’s Slush Fund Financing of Stadium (Mar. 2, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Speaker Miller Introduces Legislation]. Section 227 of the City Charter specifically
provides that:
[n]o money, except for grants or gifts from private entities, shall be paid from any
fund under the management of the city, or any fund under the management of any
agency or officer of the city, or any other entity, the majority of the members of
whose board are city officials or are appointed directly or indirectly by city
officials, except in pursuance of an appropriation by the council or other specific
legal authorization.
N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 227. The Administration has not pointed to any “specific legal
authorization” for the Mayor’s claimed power to spend PILOT funds. Bonnie Brower,
Testimony at the Public Hearing of the N.Y. City Council Comm. on Finance on Proposed
Introduction No. 584-2005 (March 22, 2005) (on file with author). Brower is the Executive
Director of City Project, a non-partisan public policy organization whose mission is to
advocate for fair fiscal policies in New York City.
205. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 874 (McKinney 2005).
206. In an attempt to rectify the situation, the City Council approved new legislation on
May 11, 2005 that requires City Council approval for all future PILOT appropriations. See
PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005, supra note 181; Frank Lombardi, Council Bars
Mayor from Stadium Aid, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 12, 2005. The new law also requires the
Mayor to file monthly reports with the City Council on the collection and use of PILOTs.
See PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005, supra note 181.
207. See supra note 191.
208. See supra Part III (describing the risks of TIF).
209. Neil deMause, Remarks at Tax Increment Financing Coming to the Big Apple?
(Mar. 12, 2003), at http://www.goodjobsny.org/tif.htm [hereinafter deMause, Remarks].
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i. Impact of PILOT Debt on the Underlying Municipality
PILOT debt, like TIF debt, is not backed by the faith and credit of the
underlying municipality. 210 Rather, PILOT bonds are secured by an
uncertain future revenue stream. To compensate bondholders for accepting
this uncertainty, PILOT bonds, like TIF bonds, are likely to carry a higher
interest rate than general obligation bonds.211
Although the HYIC will incur debt service costs on the PILOT debt
beginning in 2005, the West Side development is not expected to generate
sufficient revenue to cover these costs until approximately 2018. 212 The
Far West Side plan, acknowledging this discrepancy, authorizes the City
Council to appropriate money from the City’s capital budget to make
interest payments. 213 But, the City Council is not obligated to appropriate
City funds, and “bondholders will have no claim against the City should the
City Council choose not to make these payments.” 214
Even though bondholders will have no legal claim against the City, 215
the rating agencies may regard the HYIC’s PILOT debt as City debt. As
shown above, the rating agencies often see a link between a municipality
210. See DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 23, at 2 (noting that TIF debt is not backed by the
faith and credit of the underlying municipality); PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005,
supra note 168 (noting that, with the PILOT-backed bonds issued by the HYIC,
“bondholders will have no claim against the City”).
211. See DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that that West Side’s
PILOT-backed bonds will carry an interest rate 0.5% above the City’s general obligation
debt); see also supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that TIF debt generally
warrants a higher interest rate than general obligation debt).
212. HUDSON YARDS PRESENTATION, supra note 168.
213. PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005, supra note 168. This use of City funds
is subject to annual City Council approval. Id.
214. Under the Bloomberg Administration’s original plan, introduced in February 2004,
early interest payments would not be paid out of the City’s general fund. Instead, the HYIC
would repeatedly issue commercial paper (CP) to provide the needed revenue. HUDSON
YARDS PRESENTATION, supra note 168. The HYIC would borrow $4.1 billion, which
exceeds the anticipated project costs by $1.3 billion. PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 7602005, supra note 168. Of the $1.3 billion in additional borrowing, $948 million consisted of
the additional borrowing (in the form of CP) needed to make the interest payments on the
long-term debt. Id. In 2020, when project revenues were sufficient to cover the debt service
on the long-term bonds, the HYIC would issue roughly $1 billion in twenty-five- year bonds
and use the proceeds to repurchase the outstanding CP. Id. In response to the City
Council’s concerns about the costs of the original proposal, the Bloomberg Administration
agreed to alter the plan. Now, early interest payments may come from the City’s general
fund, subject to appropriation by the City Council. Id. By eliminating the ongoing issuance
of CP and instead using the City’s general fund to pay the interest, the HYIC will only need
to borrow approximately $3 billion rather than the originally proposed $4.1 billion. Id.
Moreover, the City Council anticipates that the revised plan will result in a more favorable
credit rating for the debt. Miller and Council Members, supra note 1.
215. See supra note 214.
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and its redevelopment agencies. 216 As such, non-repayment of the HYIC’s
PILOT bonds could endanger the City’s credit rating and its strong
borrowing position. 217 The Office of the State Comptroller warned that the
HYIC debt “may be perceived by the financial community as a moral
obligation of the City of New York and could adversely affect the city’s
credit rating.” 218 To preserve its own debt rating, the City likely would bail
out the PILOT bonds to prevent a default. According to California TIF
expert Howard Greenwich, if the HYIC defaults on the bonds, “the city
will have a hard time ever selling bonds again, so they’ll do whatever they
can to prevent that from happening.” 219
ii. Revenue Shortfalls and Cost Overruns
As with TIF, if the anticipated revenues do not materialize in the
magnitude or timeframe projected by the City then the City likely will do
whatever it can to prevent a default. 220
According to the Far West Side plan, private developers will construct
24 million square feet of office space, 12.6 million square feet of
residential space, 960,000 square feet of hotel space, and 680,000 square
feet of retail space in the Hudson Yards by 2035.221 The Office of the State
Comptroller described this plan as “ambitious.” 222 If the Far West Side
project does not attract the anticipated level of private development, then
PILOT revenues could fall short of projections. Critics of the Far West
Side project warn that the Bloomberg Administration is “overly optimistic”
about the need for new office buildings. 223 Similarly, the New York City
216. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
217. See DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 9; Bagli, Risky Effort, supra note 191
(quoting Richard Ravitch, former chairman of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, as
saying “to suggest that a default wouldn’t affect the credit of the city is silly”).
218. OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, REVIEW OF NEW YORK CITY’S FINANCIAL PLAN
FOR
FISCAL
YEARS
2005
THROUGH
2008
51
(July
2004),
at
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/osdc/rpt5-2005.pdf [hereinafter FINANCIAL P LAN].
219. deMause, Scrounging, supra note 17.
220. See supra notes 215-219 and accompanying text.
221. New York City Announces Lead Underwriters, supra note 1. The development plan
initially called for twenty-six million square feet of office space, but on January 11, 2005,
the Bloomberg Administration agreed to reduce it to twenty-four million square feet. See,
e.g., Charles V. Bagli & Mike McIntire, Mayor and Council Reach Deal on West Side
Development, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at B1; Jill Gardiner, Deal is Struck on West Side
Development, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 11, 2005, at 1.
222. FINANCIAL P LAN, supra note 218, at 49.
223. Bagli, Risky Effort, supra note 191; see also THERESA J. DEVINE, N.Y. CITY INDEP.
BUDGET OFFICE, SUPPLY AND DEMAND: CITY & STATE MAY BE PLANNING TOO MUCH
OFFICE SPACE 1 (2004), at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us [hereinafter DEVINE, TOO MUCH].
According to Betsy Gotbaum, Public Advocate for the City of New York, “[i]f 26 million
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Independent Budget Office (“IBO”) determined that the City currently has
a surplus of office space. 224 In addition to existing space, an additional 14
million square feet is currently under construction. 225 This includes 7.4
million in Midtown, 1.7 million in Lower Manhattan, 2.2 million in the
other boroughs, and 2.5 million in Northern New Jersey. 226 These
locations could absorb demand for private development in the Far West
Side. 227 With substantial space already available and even more space on
the way, private developers may choose not to build in the Far West Side,
or to build more slowly than anticipated.228
Other factors besides the current surplus of office space could cause
private development to fall short of projected levels. For example, a
private developer may not want to commit to developing in the Far West
Side until future tenants have signed leases for the new space. In turn,
potential tenants may wait to make a commitment until the Javits Center
expansion is complete, to determine how that project will impact the
neighborhood. 229 Potential tenants also may wait until the Number Seven
subway line is fully operational.230 Thus, construction delays could
significantly impact the level of private development.
As with TIF projects, the success of the Far West Side development will
depend largely on the accuracy of the projections used.231 Inaccurate
projections could leave the HYIC with insufficient revenue to service and
repay the project debt, which likely would prompt the City to raise taxes or
take money from its general fund to cover any shortfall.
iii. Cost Spillovers
PILOT projects, like TIF projects, are likely to generate increased

square feet of office space are not filled, the financing for the plan will collapse like a house
of cards.” Betsy Gotbaum, Remarks at the New York City Council Hearing on the West
Side
Financing
Plan
(Dec.
15,
2004),
at
http://pubadvocate.nyc.gov/news/releases_12_15_04.html.
224. DEVINE, TOO MUCH, supra note 223, at 4. The IBO concluded that the Far West
Side plan provides for more office space than the City needs. Id.
225. See REG’L P LAN ASS’N, THE FAR WEST SIDE & THE REGION’S FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
NEEDS 5 (2004), at http://www.rpa.org/pdf/RPA_FWS_PAPER.pdf.
226. Id.
227. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 10.
228. DEVINE, TOO MUCH, supra note 223, at 1.
229. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 11; see also supra note 2 for a discussion
of the proposed Javits Center expansion.
230. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 11.
231. Id. at 9 (“The success of the proposed revenue plan will hinge critically on the
accuracy of the development projections used as its basis.”).
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demand for city services. 232 The new development on the Far West Side
will bring more employees, residents, and visitors to the area.233 To
accommodate these newcomers, the Department of City Planning and the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority have determined that, at a
minimum, the City will require a new firehouse, a new school, and possibly
a new daycare center.234 Yet, the funding plan does not take the cost of
these new facilities into account. 235 And even if the project generates
revenue in excess of what is needed to service the debt, the excess may not
be available to pay for these facilities, because the HYIC is not obligated to
transfer the excess to the City’s general fund. 236 Thus, to pay for these new
facilities, the City likely will have to increase taxes or withdraw existing
taxes. As a result, taxpayers may wind up subsidizing the development.
iv. Lack of Voter Accountability
The Far West Side project, like many TIF projects, allows the local
government to act without any meaningful accountability to voters. Some
accountability does exist, in that Mayor Bloomberg plans to run for reelection and thus has some incentive to act in voters’ best interests.237 This
accountability, however, is very limited. Mayor Bloomberg unilaterally
determined that the HYIC debt will be repaid from PILOT revenue rather
than from the City’s budget. 238 In so doing, the Mayor sidestepped the
normal budget approval process, as the City Council (which is composed of
elected officials) is supposed to have final budget approval powers.
According to New York City Council Member Joel Rivera, “[t]he Mayor
has successfully circumvented the formal budget process, which denies
people the right to a transparent government.” 239
Furthermore, as is often the case with TIF agencies, 240 the HYIC
officials will be appointed rather than elected by voters. 241 This means that

232. For a discussion of the cost spillovers that may arise with TIF projects, see supra
notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
233. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 11.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. E.g., Andrew Jacobs, Bloomberg Claims a Victory in Battling Homelessness, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2005, at B4 (noting that Mayor Bloomberg is campaigning for re-election).
238. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
239. Speaker Miller Introduces Legislation, supra note 204.
240. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
241. See Miller and Council Members, supra note 1. Some officials will be appointed
solely by the Mayor, while others will be appointed by the City Council Speaker, City
Comptroller, Manhattan Borough President, local Council Members and the local
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voters cannot even express their disapproval of the financing plan by voting
against HYIC officials in future elections.
4. Critique and Recommendations
The Far West Side development is billed as a self-financing project,242
but, as with TIF, revenue shortfalls and cost overruns may occur,
prompting the City to raise taxes or divert money from its general fund.
The sheer magnitude of the Far West Side development increases the
likelihood that something will go wrong and the City will have to step in.
Most TIF bond issues are small, with an average issue size of roughly $6
million. 243 The two uses of TIF in New York involved bond issues of $8
million and $770,000.244 In contrast, the HYIC plans to issue almost $3
billion in TIF-like debt, which is ten times the size of the largest
preexisting TIF bond issue on record. 245
The Far West Side financing plan has raised controversy because of its
lack of transparency and accountability. The Mayor should not have
unilateral discretion over the use of PILOT funds. Instead, determining
how PILOT funds will be used should be part of the City’s budget process.
This would give taxpayers more of a voice in how their tax dollars are
used. 246 When describing the Mayor’s use of PILOTs for the Far West
Side project, Council Member Oliver Koppell remarked that, “[t]he
expenditure of hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars without the
approval of the legislature is a violation of basic democratic principals and
assertion of an imperial mayoralty.” 247 On May 11, 2005, however, the
City Council passed a law that requires Council approval for all future
PILOT appropriations. 248 The new law also requires the Mayor to file
monthly reports regarding the collection and use of PILOTs.249 This law is
a step in the right direction.
If, as the Bloomberg Administration argues, the development of the Far
West Side is so critical to the City’s economic future, then perhaps the
public improvements should be funded out of the City’s capital budget.
Community Board. Id.
242. See supra note 191.
243. Johnson, supra note 103, at 4. No TIF issue has exceeded $1 billion thus far.
McDonald, IBO Leery, supra note 173, at 1.
244. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
245. deMause, Remarks, supra note 209.
246. Speaker Miller Introduces Legislation, supra note 204. Taxpayers do already have
some voice, in that they elect the mayor.
247. Id.
248. See supra note 206.
249. See supra note 206.
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Funding a project through the capital budget gives taxpayers indirect
power, because the City Council has final budget approval powers (and
City Council members are elected by the voting public). The City likely
could find room in its budget to finance the Far West Side development. In
a March 2005 report, the IBO indicated that the City will end fiscal year
2005 with the largest budget surplus since 2001. 250 According to IBO
Director Ronnie Lowenstein, this means that “there are some additional
resources to work with.” 251
Another alternative would be for the City to use the pay-as-you-go
approach. Under this approach, private developers obtain their own
funding and front the costs. 252 The City would then repay the developers
out of the incremental tax revenue generated if and when the development
occurs. 253 The developer, rather than the municipality, bears the risk that
the development will not generate enough revenue to cover the project
This approach better protects taxpayers from local tax
costs. 254
255
At the very least, the City should negotiate firm commitments
increases.
with private developers before making the public improvements. 256
CONCLUSION
The use of PILOT financing, like the use of TIF, raises the question of
who pays for the development. Although on their face both TIF and
PILOT financing may seem like self-funding mechanisms, in reality this
designation is misplaced. If the tax revenue does not materialize as
planned, then the underlying municipality likely will increase taxes or take
money from its general fund to prevent a debt rating downgrade.
Moreover, taxpayers directly subsidize these projects by paying for the
municipal services required by the new development. Because taxpayers
are the ultimate repayers of the debt should the project fail, it does not seem
right that the decision to use either TIF or PILOTs can be made without
taxpayer input. Local officials should not be swayed by the argument that
TIF and PILOT projects are self-financing. Instead, before implementing a
project backed by either TIF or PILOT bonds, local officials must carefully

250. N.Y. CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE MAYOR’S PRELIMINARY
BUDGET FOR 2006 3 (2005), at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us.
251. Nicholas Confessore, Larger Surplus in City’s Budget is Predicted, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2005, at B1.
252. See, e.g., Man, supra note 18, at 93; Reinert, supra note 25, at 1028.
253. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1028.
254. Id.
255. See Man, supra note 18, at 93.
256. See Kemanski, supra note 114, at 26.
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consider whether such a project really is in the taxpayers’ best interest.

